Is Strategic Autonomy now the only game in town?

Trump’s election yesterday may accelerate the EU’s shift towards the more hawkish foreign economic policy we already see in von der Leyen’s political guidelines, the roles of her top officials, and the host of recent and forthcoming policy proposals.

Depending on your worldview, this could be cynical protectionism of an uncompetitive Union, or a much-needed dose of realpolitik assertiveness to protect our economy and ensure Europe’s ‘Strategic Autonomy’.

Indeed, several EU industry associations have already seized on the election results to call for less regulation and more funding for their critical sectors, in the face of rising pressure from what von der Leyen now calls “strategic competitors and systemic rivals”.

I’m undecided if this is the wholesale right approach, but see the logic in some cases. I imagine European steel or aluminium lobbyist will grab at whatever they can to make sure they’re not going to get hit with even more US tariffs, promised to secure enough votes to flip Pennsylvania – and the White House – red.

But what is Strategic Autonomy?

Strategic Autonomy also has the advocacy benefit of being a useful floating signifier: a campaigning tool to define something loosely enough to appeal to many groups, but specific enough to align and move them in your preferred direction. Sort of like if Obama’s “Hope” or Macron’s “Ensemble” had been workshopped by technocrats.

But that lack of clarity is also a risk. Trying to leverage a concept that is not commonly understood opens you up to all kind of policymaking and advocacy uncertainty. When NGOs and MEPs meet to discuss migration, both parties more or less know what the other is talking about. This is less the case for the loosely-defined, highly abstract, multi-faceted notion of Strategic Autonomy - where your message may get lost in translation.

As an example of how poor the understanding of Strategic Autonomy is, I tried to identify the European Parliament’s centre of gravity on the topic. Below I plot the distribution of how MEPs voted on a series of Strategic Autonomy-related plenary amendments in the last legislature. If an MEP is at 1.00, they voted for every ‘pro’ Strategic Autonomy amendment. If an MEP is at -1.00, they voted against or abstained on every ‘pro’ Strategic Autonomy amendment.

I found these results genuinely surprising. For some groups (especially EPP, S&D, and slightly less so for Renew and ECR), votes were almost normally distributed: the average MEP votes was close to smack bang in the middle or being pro- and anti-Strategic Autonomy.

When I run the same exercise for other policy areas (and if you want to know voting trends for your topic, reach out to me) a lot of them tend to look more like power law distributions, with the vast majority of the votes at one extreme (not far off 1.00 or -1.00) then tailing off.

I think this means MEPs and whips haven’t made up their minds on how their group will position itself on the topic – possibly because no one knows quite what it is. With Trump, the Commission’s new economic doctrine, and a slew of proposals in the pipeline, we might expect voting habits to become more clustered at the margins, as parliamentary minds are focused and positions are firmed up.

A complex systems analysis

This impending shift might also make sense from a complex systems perspective. Complex systems like the EU exhibit several traits, including power laws – so it’s not unusual to expect this distribution to drift over time.

But a complexity approach would also suggest:

  • This policy area may be susceptible to large change based on comparatively small developments (not dissimilar to how a group of Dutch farmers managed to almost wipe out five years of EU green deal policy work).

  • Feedback plays an important role: complex systems in nature and their agents must adapt if they wish to flourish, the same is true of stakeholders in Brussels.

  • Systems trend towards disorder and chaos. Imposing and maintaining (your form of) order and legibility is difficult and requires a lot of energy.

(Again, if you want to discuss in more detail how complexity impacts EU policymaking and advocacy, do reach out).

Conclusion: modular strategies, attuned to feedback, and benefiting from volatility

So my thoughts for those looking to ride the Strategic Autonomy wave are: this is a particularly embryonic policy idea in Brussels. What we talk about today when we use the term Strategic Autonomy, what we see in position papers and pink papers, almost certainly will not be to the Strategic Autonomy policy we see a few weeks, months or years down the line. Given its embryonic nature, I wouldn’t be surprise if the agenda shifts more quickly and unpredictably here than in other areas.

The changes to the policy agenda will – in part – be driven by unforeseen, external forces and emerge in unpredictable ways. Institutional positions will move towards an ‘equilibrium state’, where shifts in stances slow or stop. This state may be suboptimal, and will be extremely difficult and energy intensive to impose your will on.

None of this is to say you shouldn’t try to shape the debate (in fact, for a lot of us, it’s probably in our job description) but perhaps to consider:

  • Making your strategy modular, so achieving your objectives isn’t wholly dependent on a volatile policy area like Strategic Autonomy. (i.e. you can lose on Strategic Autonomy, but still get (most of) what you want elsewhere).

  • Looking for leverage points or critical junctures where your small actions have the highest likelihood of delivering outsized impact and focusing most of your efforts there (another case of power laws?).

  • Be highly attuned to the feedback complex systems provide, and be willing to change your approach quickly when indicators suggest to do so.

Or – and this may be a bet-the-house-level decision to be taken elsewhere in the organisation – pivot your business model so it becomes anti-fragile: so it actually benefits from a more complex, less predictable world. But that may be a bit dramatic…

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